Economic Growth and Global Warming: 
A Model of Multiple Equilibria and Thresholds 

by 

Alfred Greiner and Willi Semmler 

University of Bielefeld 
Department of Economics 
Center for Empirical Macroeconomics 
P.O. Box 100 131 
33501 Bielefeld, Germany 
(http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/~cem)
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Alfred Greiner∗ Willi Semmler‡

Abstract

This paper studies the dynamics of an economic growth model with global warming. Recent research on climate change suggests that there exists a negative feedback effect from global surface temperature and the capacity of the earth to reflect radiation. Our paper takes into account that the ratio of reflected to incident radiation of the earth, i.e. the albedo, negatively depends on the average surface temperature. We presume a simple model of endogenous growth where economic growth is affected by global warming and analyze the dynamics of economic growth and global warming for both the problem of a competitive economy and the social planner’s problem. Our regulatory instrument is an emission tax rate. We demonstrate that for certain values of the emission tax ratio the competitive economy exhibits multiple equilibria and a threshold may exist which separates the domains of attraction for the growth paths. There exist paths to high growth rates and low temperature and low growth rates and high temperature, separated by a threshold. For the planner’s problem the long run equilibrium is unique unless the damage of global warming is very small.

Keywords: Thresholds, multiple equilibria, global warming, endogenous growth
JEL: C61, O13, Q30

∗Department of Economics, Bielefeld University, P.O. Box 100131, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany
‡CEM, Bielefeld and New School University
1 Introduction

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) it is certain that the global average surface temperature of the earth has increased since 1861. Over the 20th century the temperature has increased by about 0.6 degree Celsius and it is very likely\(^1\) that the 1990s was the warmest decade since 1861 ([10], p. 26). Further, the rise in the average global surface temperature has been accompanied by an increase in heavy and extreme weather events, primarily in the Northern Hemisphere.\(^2\) In general, changes in the climate may occur as a result of both internal variability within the climate system and as a result of external factors where the latter can be natural or anthropogenic. However, there is strong evidence that most of the climate change observed over the last 50 years is the result of human activities. Especially, the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs), like carbon dioxide \((CO_2)\) or methane \((CH_4)\) just to mention two, are considered as the cause for global warming and these emissions continue to alter the atmosphere in ways that are expected to affect the climate.

In the economics literature, the effect of global warming is modelled mostly using integrated assessment models. These are computable general equilibrium models in which stylized climatic interrelations are taken into account by a climate subsystem incorporated in the model. Examples for this type of models are CETA (see [19]), FUND (see [25]), RICE and DICE (see [18]), WIAGEM (see [15]) or DART (see [2]). The goal of these studies, then, is to evaluate different abatement scenarios as to economic welfare and as to their effects on GHG emissions.\(^3\) In analyzing implications of climate policies these models neglect transition dynamics, instead, it is assumed that the economy is in some steady state. Further, the growth rate of the economy is taken as exogenously given and feedback effects of lower GHG concentrations in the atmosphere on economic growth are neglected.

There is another important research direction, undertaken by scientists, that studies the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change through the change of ocean

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\(^1\)Very likely (likely) means that the level of confidence is between 90 – 99 (66 – 90) percent.

\(^2\)More climate changes are documented in [10], p. 34.

\(^3\)However, the results are not necessarily robust. See e.g. [20] who shows that the outcome in [18] changes when technical change is taken into account.
circulations and that can also be related to our study. The papers by Deutsch et al. (2002) and Keller et al. (2002), for example, describe how the gulf stream and the North Atlantic current, part of the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation (THC), transport a large amount of heat from warm regions to Europe. As those papers show, due to the heating up of surface water, the currents could suddenly change and trigger a change in temperature. The THC collapse and the sudden cooling of regions would most likely have a strong economic impact on Europe and Africa. An event like this would have an impact on the climate in these regions and is also likely to affect economic growth. In our modeling of the interaction of economic growth and climate change, we will leave aside this possibly catastrophic event, although it might exacerbate some of the results obtained in our paper.

The overall goal of our paper is different from the above studies. Our primary goal is not to evaluate different abatement policies as to their welfare effects, as the first type of studies do, nor modeling exacerbating events for global warming. We want to study, in the context of simple endogenous growth model, the long run effects of the interaction of global warming and economic growth and, in particular, the transitions dynamics that might occur with global warming. More specifically, we want to study the question of whether there possibly exist multiple equilibria and thresholds which separate basins of attraction for optimal paths to some long run steady state. In order to study such a problem, we take a basic endogenous growth model as starting point and integrate a simple climate model.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start with a description of facts concerning GHG emissions and changes in average surface temperature of the earth using a simple energy balance model (EBM). Section 3 introduces the competitive version of our growth model. In this section we first present the structure of our model, analyze its dynamics and, then, study the question of how robust these results are and perform some comparative statics. Section 4 presents and analyzes the social planner’s problem and section 5, finally, concludes the paper.
2 GHG emissions and the change in average global surface temperature

We begin with a description of current state of the knowledge concerning GHG emissions and the change in global average surface temperature. The simplest method of considering the climate system of the earth is in terms of its global energy balance which is done by so-called energy balance models (EBM). According to an EBM the change in the average surface temperature on earth is described by

\[
\frac{dT(t)}{dt} c_h = T(t) c_h = S_E - H(t) - F_N(t), \quad T(0) = T_0, \tag{1}
\]

with \(T(t)\) the average global surface temperature measured in Kelvin \(^5\) (K), \(c_h\) the heat capacity \(^6\) of the earth with dimension \(Jm^{-2}K^{-1}\) (Joule per square meter per Kelvin) \(^7\) which is considered a constant parameter, \(S_E\) is the solar input, \(H(t)\) is the non-radiative energy flow, and \(F_N(t) = F^\uparrow(t) - F^\downarrow(t)\) is the difference between the outgoing radiative flux and the incoming radiative flux. \(S_E, H(t)\) and \(F_N(t)\) have the dimension Watt per square meter \((Wm^{-2})\). \(t\) is the time argument which will be omitted in the following as long as no ambiguity can arise. \(F^\uparrow\) follows the Stefan-Boltzmann-Gesetz which is

\[
F^\uparrow = \epsilon \sigma_T T^4, \tag{2}
\]

with \(\epsilon\) the emissivity which gives the ratio of actual emission to blackbody emission. Blackbodies are objects which emit the maximum amount of radiation and which have \(\epsilon = 1\). For the earth \(\epsilon\) can be set to \(\epsilon = 0.95\). \(\sigma_T\) is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant which is given by \(\sigma_T = 5.67 \times 10^{-8} Wm^{-2}K^{-4}\). Further, the ratio \(F^\uparrow / F^\downarrow\) is given by \(F^\uparrow / F^\downarrow = 109/88\). The difference \(S_E - H\) can be written as \(S_E - H = Q(1 - \alpha_1(T))/4,\) with \(Q = 1367.5 Wm^{-2}\) the solar constant, \(\alpha_1(T)\) the planetary albedo, determining how much of the incoming energy is reflected to space.

\(^4\)This subsection follows \[21\] chap. 10.2.1 and chap. 1 and \[8\], chap. 1.4 and chap. 2.4. See also \[6\]. A more complex presentation can be found in \[7\].

\(^5\)273 Kelvin are 0 degree Celsius.

\(^6\)The heat capacity is the amount of heat that needs to be added per square meter of horizontal area to raise the surface temperature of the reservoir by 1K.

\(^7\)1 Watt is 1 Joule per second.
According to [8] and [22] the albedo $\alpha_1(T)$ is a function which negatively depends on the temperature on earth. This holds because deviations from the equilibrium average surface temperature have feedback effects which affect the reflection of incoming energy. Examples for such feedback effects are the ice-albedo feedback mechanism and the water vapour 'greenhouse' effect (see [8], chap. 1.4). With higher temperatures a feedback mechanism occurs with the areas covered by snow and ice likely to be reduced. This implies that a smaller amount of solar radiation is reflected when the temperature rises tending to further increase the temperature on earth. Another positive feedback results from the increase of atmospheric water vapour as temperatures increase. Water vapour is the dominant greenhouse gas in the atmosphere and a rise in water vapour raises the greenhouse effect. Therefore, [8] (chap. 2.4) and [22] (p. 194) propose a function as shown in figure 1.

![Figure 1](image_url)

Figure 1 shows $1 - \alpha_1(T)$, i.e. that part of energy which is not reflected by earth. For the average temperature smaller than $T_l$ the albedo is a constant, then the albedo declines linearly, so that $1 - \alpha_1(T)$ rises, until the temperature reaches $T_u$ from which on the albedo is constant again.

Summarizing this discussion the EBM can be rewritten as

$$
\dot{T}(t) c_h = \frac{1367.5}{4} (1 - \alpha_1(T)) - 0.95 \left(5.67 \times 10^{-8}\right) \left(\frac{21}{109}\right) T^4, \quad T(0) = T_0.
$$

(3)
According to [21], \((1 - \alpha_1(T)) = 0.21\) holds in equilibrium, i.e. for \(\dot{T} = 0\), giving a surface temperature of about 288 Kelvin which is about 15 degree Celsius.

\(c_h\) is the heat capacity of the earth. Since most of the earth’s surface is covered by seawater \(c_h\) is largely determined by the oceans. Therefore, the heat capacity of the oceans is used as a proxy for that of the earth. \(c_h\) is then given by \(c_h = \rho_w c_w d\), with \(\rho_w\) the density of seawater (1027 \(m^{-3} kg\)), \(c_w\) the specific heat of water (4186 \(J kg^{-1} K^{-1}\)) and \(d\) the depth of the mixed layer which is set to 70 meters. The constant 0.7 results from the fact that 70 percent of the earth are covered with seawater. Inserting the numerical values, assuming a depth of 70 meters and dividing by the surface of the earth gives \(c_h = 0.1497 \ J m^{-2} K^{-1}\).

The effect of emitting GHGs is to raise the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere which increases the greenhouse effect of the earth. This is done by calculating the so-called radiative forcing which is a measure of the influence a GHG, like \(CO_2\) or \(CH_4\), has on changing the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the earth-atmosphere system. The dimension of the radiative forcing is \(W m^{-2}\). For example, for \(CO_2\) the radiative forcing, which we denote as \(F\), is given by

\[
F = 6.3 \ln \frac{M}{M_o},
\]

with \(M\) the actual \(CO_2\) concentration, \(M_o\) the pre-industrial \(CO_2\) concentration and \(\ln\) the natural logarithm (see [12], p. 52-53).\(^8\) For other GHGs other formulas can be given describing their respective radiative forcing and these values can be converted in \(CO_2\) equivalents. Incorporating (4) in (3) gives

\[
\dot{T}(t) c_h = \frac{1367.5}{4} (1 - \alpha_1(T)) - 0.95 (5.67 \times 10^{-8}) (21/109) T^4 + \beta_1 (1 - \xi) 6.3 \ln \frac{M}{M_o}, T(0) = T_0.
\]

The parameter \(\xi\) captures the fact that \(\xi = 0.3\) of the warmth generated by the greenhouse effect is absorbed by the oceans which transport the heat from upper layers to the deep sea. \(\beta_1\), finally, is assumed to take values between 1.1 and 3.4 and takes into account that with a higher GHG concentration and, consequently, a higher temperature on earth the ability of oceans to absorb warmth is reduced.

\(^8\)The \(CO_2\) concentration is given in parts per million (ppm).
The concentration of GHGs $M$, finally, evolves according to the following differential equation
\[ \dot{M} = \beta_2 E - \mu M, M(0) = M_0. \] (6)

$E$ denotes emissions and $\mu$ is the inverse of the atmospheric lifetime of $CO_2$. As to the parameter $\mu$ we assume a value of $\mu = 0.1$. $\beta_2$ captures the fact that a certain part of GHG emissions are taken up by oceans and do not enter the atmosphere. According to IPCC $\beta_2 = 0.49$ for the time period 1990 to 1999 for $CO_2$ emissions ([10], p. 39).

3 The competitive economy

In this section we present our economic framework. We start with the description of the structure of our economy.

3.1 The structure of the economy

We consider an economy where one homogeneous good is produced. Further, the economy is represented by one individual with household production who maximizes a discounted stream of utility arising from per capita consumption, $C$, times the number of household members subject to a budget constraint. As to the utility function we assume a logarithmic function $U(C) = \ln C$.

The individual’s budget constraint in per capita terms is given by
\[ Y(1 - \tau) = \dot{K} + C + A + \tau E L^{-1} + (\delta + n)K, K(0) = K_0, \] (7)

with $Y$ per capita production, $K$ per capita capital, $A$ per capita abatement activities and $E$ emissions. $\tau \in (0, 1)$ is the income tax rate, $\tau_E > 0$ is the tax on emission and $\delta$ is the depreciation rate of capital. $L$ is labour which grows at rate $n$. In our model formulation abatement is a private good. The production function is given by
\[ Y = BK^\alpha K^{1-\alpha} D(T - T_0), \] (8)

\[ ^9\text{The range of } \mu \text{ given by IPCC is } \mu \in (0.005, 0.2), \text{ see [10], p. 38.} \]

\[ ^{10}\text{The per capita budget constraint is derived from the budget constraint with aggregate variables, denoted by the subscript } g, \text{ according to } \dot{K}/K = \dot{K}_g/K_g - \dot{L}/L. \]

\[ ^{11}\text{There exist some contributions which model abatement as a public good. See e.g. [16] or [17].} \]
with $K$ per capita capital, $\alpha \in (0,1)$ the capital share and $B$ is a positive constant. $D(T - T_0)$ is the damage due to deviations from the normal temperature $T_0$ and has the same functional form as $D(\cdot)$. $K$ gives positive externalities from capital resulting from spillovers. This assumption implies that in equilibrium the private gross marginal returns to capital$^{12}$ are constant and equal to $\alpha BD(\cdot)$, thus generating sustained per capita growth if $B$ is sufficiently large. This is the simplest endogenous growth model existing in the economics literature. However, since we are not interested in explaining sustained per capita growth but in the interrelation between global warming and economic growth this model is sufficiently elaborate.

We should also like to point out that we only consider an emission tax and not other environmental policies like tradeable permits. We do this because we consider a representative agent. We not have multiple actors in our study who can trade permits. Therefore we consider the emission tax as the regulatory instrument. However, we are aware that under certain more realistic scenarios permits may be superior to taxation as an environmental policy measure. Permits might become important, in particular when it is difficult to evaluate marginal costs and benefits of abatement so that the effects of an environmental tax are difficult to evaluate. In this case permits which limit the quantity of emissions are preferable.$^{13}$

As concerns emissions of GHGs we assume that these are a by-product of capital used in production and expressed in $CO_2$ equivalents. So emissions are a function of per capita capital relative to per capita abatement activities. This implies that a higher capital stock goes along with higher emissions for a given level of abatement spending. This assumption is frequently encountered in environmental economics (see e.g. [24] or [9]). It should also be mentioned that the emission of GHGs does not affect utility and production directly but only indirectly by affecting the climate of the earth which leads to a higher surface temperature and to more extreme weather situations. Formally, emissions are described

$^{12}$With gross return we mean the return to capital before tax and for the temperature equal to the pre-industrial level.

$^{13}$For an extensive treatment of permits and its implementational problems, when used as regulatory instrument to correct for market failure, see Chichilnisky (2002).
by
\[ E = \left( \frac{aK}{A} \right)^\gamma, \] (9)
with \( \gamma > 0 \) and \( a > 0 \) constants. The parameter \( a \) can be interpreted as a technology index describing how polluting a given technology is. For large values of \( a \) a given stock of capital (and abatement) goes along with high emissions implying a relatively polluting technology and vice versa.

The government in our economy is modelled very simple. The government’s task is to correct the market failure caused by the negative environmental externality.\(^{14}\) The revenue of the government is used for non-productive uses and it does not influence the utility of the household. This implies that government spending does not affect the consumption-investment decision of the household.

The agent’s optimization problem can be written as
\[ \max_{C,A} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}L_0e^{nt} \ln C dt, \] (10)
subject to (7), (8) and (9). \( \rho \) in (10) is the subjective discount rate, \( L_0 \) is labour supply at time \( t = 0 \) which we normalize to unity and which grows at constant rate \( n \). It should be noted that in the competitive economy the agents neither take into account the negative externality of capital, the emission of GHG, nor the positive externalities, i.e. the spillover effects.

To find the optimal solution we form the current-value Hamiltonian\(^{15}\) which is
\[ H(\cdot) = \ln C + \lambda_1 ((1 - \tau) BK^{\alpha} \bar{K}^{1-\alpha} D(\cdot) - C - A - \tau E L^{-1} a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma} - (\delta + n)K), \] (11)
with \( \lambda_1 \) the shadow price of \( K \). Note that we used \( E = a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma} \).

The necessary optimality conditions are given by
\[ \frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial C} = C^{-1} - \lambda_1 = 0, \] (12)
\[ \frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial A} = \tau E L^{-1} a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma-1} - 1 = 0, \] (13)
\[ \dot{\lambda}_1 = (\rho + \delta) \lambda_1 - \lambda_1 ((1 - \tau) B \alpha D(\cdot) - (\tau E/LK) \gamma a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma}) \] . (14)

\(^{14}\) How the government has to take into account the positive externality is studied in section 4.

\(^{15}\) For an introduction to the optimality conditions of Pontryagin’s maximum principle see [5] or [23].
In (14) we used that in equilibrium $K = \dot{K}$ holds. Further, the limiting transversality condition $\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-\rho t} \lambda_1 K = 0$ must hold.

Using (12) and (14) we can derive a differential equation giving the growth rate of per capita consumption. This equation is obtained as

$$\frac{\dot{C}}{C} = -(\rho + \delta) + \alpha (1 - \tau) BD(\cdot) - \gamma \frac{\tau E}{LK} a^\gamma A^{-\gamma}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

Combining (13) and (9) yields

$$E = \left( \frac{\tau E}{LK} \right)^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} a^{\gamma/(1+\gamma)} \gamma^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

Using (5) and (6) from section 2 with the numerical parameter values introduced and the equations derived in this section the competitive economy is completely described by the following differential equations

$$\dot{T}(t)_{ch} = \frac{1367.5}{4} (1 - \alpha_1(T)) - 0.95 \left( 5.67 \times 10^{-5} \right) (21/109) T^4 +$$
$$\beta_1 (1 - \xi) 6.3 \ln \frac{M}{M_0}, \ T(0) = T_0$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

$$\dot{M} = \beta_2 \left( \frac{\tau E}{LK} \right)^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} a^{\gamma/(1+\gamma)} \gamma^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} - \mu M, \ M(0) = M_0$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

$$\frac{\dot{C}}{C} = -(\rho + \delta) + \alpha (1 - \tau) BD(\cdot) - \gamma \left( \frac{\tau E}{LK} \right)^{1/(1+\gamma)} a^{\gamma/(1+\gamma)} \gamma^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

$$\frac{\dot{K}}{K} = (1 - \tau) BD(T - T_0) - \left( \frac{\tau E}{LK} \right)^{1/(1+\gamma)} a^{\gamma/(1+\gamma)} \gamma^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} (1 + \gamma) -$$
$$\frac{C}{K} - (\delta + n), \ K(0) = K_0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

where $C(0)$ can be chosen by society.

### 3.2 The dynamics of the competitive economy

First we define a balanced growth path or steady state.

**Definition** A balanced growth path (BGP) is a path such that $\dot{T} = 0$, $\dot{M} = 0$ and $\frac{\dot{C}}{C} = \frac{\dot{K}}{K}$ hold, with $M \geq M_o$.

This definition contains several aspects. First, we require that the temperature and the GHG concentration must be constant along a BGP. This is a sustainability aspect.
Second, the growth rate of per capita consumption equals that of per capita capital and is constant. Third, we only consider balanced growth paths with a GHG concentration which is larger than or equal to the pre-industrial level. This requirement is made for reasons of realism. Since the GHG concentration has been rising monotonically over the last decades it is not necessary to consider a situation with a declining GHG concentration.

To study the dynamics of our model we consider the ratio $c \equiv C/K$ which is constant on a BGP. Thus, our dynamic system is given by the following differential equations

$$
\dot{T}(t) = \left(\frac{1367.5}{4} (1 - \alpha_1(T)) - 0.95 \left(5.67 \times 10^{-8}\right) (21/109) T^4\right) c^{-1} + \left(\beta_1 (1 - \xi) 6.3 \ln \frac{M}{M_0}\right) c^{-1}, \quad T(0) = T_0 \tag{21}
$$

$$
\dot{M} = \beta_2 \left(\frac{\tau_E}{LK}\right)^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} a^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} - \gamma/(1+\gamma) - \mu M, \quad M(0) = M_0 \tag{22}
$$

$$
\dot{c} = c \left((n - \rho) - (1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau) BD(\cdot) + \left(\frac{\tau_E}{LK}\right)^{1/(1+\gamma)} a^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} - \gamma/(1+\gamma) + c\right), \tag{23}
$$

where $c(0)$ can again be chosen freely by society.

To study the dynamics of our model we resort to numerical simulation. We start with a description of the parameter values we employ in our numerical analysis.

We consider one time period to comprise one year. The discount rate is set to $\rho = 0.03$, the population growth rate is assumed to be $n = 0.02$ and the depreciation rate of capital is $\delta = 0.075$. The pre-industrial level of GHGs is normalized to one, i.e. $M_o = 1$, and we set $\gamma = 1$. $\beta_1$ and $\xi$ are set to $\beta_1 = 1.1$ and $\xi = 0.3$ (see section 2). The income tax rate is $\tau = 0.15$ and the capital share is $\alpha = 0.45$. This value seems to be high. However, if capital is considered in a broad sense meaning that it also comprises human capital this value is reasonable. $B$ is set to $B = 0.35$ implying that the social gross marginal return to capital is 35 percent for $T = T_o$.

As to $\tau_E/LK$ we set $\tau_E/LK = 0.001$ which is in line with ratios in industrialized countries. For example, in Germany the ratio of tax on mineral oil to private gross capital was 0.0037 in 1999 (see [26], p. 510, 639) and $a$ is set to $a = 1.65 \times 10^{-4}$. Below, we will analyze how different values for $\tau_E/LK$ affect the dynamics of our model. As concerns the damage function $D(\cdot)$ we assume the function

$$
D(\cdot) = \left(a_1 (T - T_o)^2 + 1\right)^{-\psi}, \tag{24}
$$

10
with $a_1 > 0$, $\psi > 0$. As to the numerical values of the parameters in (24) we assume $a_1 = 0.04$ and $\psi = 0.05$. These values imply that a rise of the surface temperature by $3 \ (2, \ 1)$ degree(s) implies a damage of $1.5 \ (0.7, \ 0.2)$ percent. The IPCC estimates that a doubling of GHGs, which goes along with an increase of the global average surface temperature between $1.5$ and $4.5$ degree Celsius, reduces world GDP by $1.5$ to $2$ percent (see [11], p. 218), so that our choice for the parameters seems justified.

As to the albedo, $\alpha_1(T)$, we use a function as shown in figure 1. We approximate the function shown in figure 1 by a differentiable function. More concretely, we use the function

$$1 - \alpha_1(T) = k_1 \left( \frac{2}{\Pi} \right) \text{ArcTan} \left( \frac{\Pi(T - 293)}{2} \right) + k_2. \tag{25}$$

$k_1$ and $k_2$ are parameters which are set to $k_1 = 5.6 \ 10^{-3}$ and $k_2 = 0.2135$. Figure 2 shows the function $(1 - \alpha_1(T))$ for these parameter values.

![Figure 2](image-url)

With (25) the pre-industrial average global surface temperature is about $287.8$ Kelvin (for $M = M_o$) and $1 - \alpha_1(\cdot) = 0.2083$. For $T \to \infty$ the expression $1 - \alpha_1(\cdot)$ converges to $1 - \alpha_1(\cdot) = 0.2191$ which corresponds to an increase of about $5$ percent.

To get insight into our model we first note that on a BGP the GHG concentration and the average global surface temperature are completely determined by the emission tax
rate $\tau_{E}/LK$. This holds because this ratio determines optimal abatement spending via (13). The global surface temperature on the BGP, then, gives the ratio of consumption to capital and the balanced growth rate, $g$. Solving (22)=0 with respect to $M$ and inserting the result in (21) $\equiv dT$ gives a function as shown in figure 3.

One realizes that there are 3 solutions for $dT = 0$. Table 1 gives the steady state values for $T^*$ and $c^*$ and the balanced growth rate, $g$, as well as the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to (21)-(23).\textsuperscript{16}

Table 1. Steady state values, balanced growth rate and eigenvalues for the competitive model with $\tau_{E}/LK = 0.001$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steady state</th>
<th>$T^*$</th>
<th>$c^*$</th>
<th>$g$</th>
<th>eigenvalues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>291.5</td>
<td>0.1697</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>-4.99, 0.17, -0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>293.2</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>4.76, 0.167, -0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.1657</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>-3.55, 0.166, -0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that the first and third long-run steady states (I and III) are saddle point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable, while the second is unstable, with the exception of a one-dimensional stable point stable.

\textsuperscript{16}The * gives steady state values.
Thus, there are two possible long-run steady states to which the economy can converge. The first one implies a temperature increase of about 3.7 degrees and a balanced growth rate of about 2.6 percent, the other BGP corresponds to a temperature increase of about 6.2 degrees and a balanced growth rate of about 2.2 percent. $1 - \alpha_1(\cdot)$ takes the value 0.2093 for $T^* = 291.5$ and 0.2171 for $T^* = 294$ showing that the quantitative decrease in the albedo does not have to be large for the occurrence of multiple equilibria. Our result suggests that there exists a threshold such that the initial conditions determine whether it is optimal to converge to steady state I or III.

### 3.3 Robustness and comparative static results

The last subsection demonstrated that there may exist a threshold for the competitive economy which determines whether it is optimal to converge to the long-run equilibrium which corresponds to a relatively small rise in the temperature or to the one with a large temperature increase. Here, we want to address the question of how robust this result is with respect to the emission tax ratio $\tau_E/LK$. Further, we want to undertake some welfare considerations for the economy on the BGP.

Varying the emission tax rate $\tau_E/LK$ affects the position of the $dT$ curve in figure 3, thus, determining the equilibrium temperature and, possibly, the number of equilibria. A rise in $\tau_E/LK$ shifts the $dT$ curve downward and to the left implying a decrease of the temperature(s) on the BGP. Further, for a sufficiently high value of $\tau_E/LK$ only one equilibrium exists. For example, raising $\tau_E/LK$ to $\tau_E/LK = 0.0011$ gives a unique long-run BGP with a steady state temperature of 291.8 Kelvin. This equilibrium is saddle point stable (two negative real eigenvalues). Reducing $\tau_E/LK$ to $\tau_E/LK = 0.0008$ also gives a unique BGP with a steady state equilibrium temperature of 294.8 Kelvin. This equilibrium is also saddle point stable (two negative real eigenvalues). This demonstrates that the government choice of the emission tax ratio is crucial as concerns the long-run outcome. This holds for both the temperature in equilibrium and for the dynamics of the system.

Presuming the uniqueness of the steady state, we can concentrate on welfare considerations. We will limit our investigations to the model on the BGP. Welfare on the BGP
is given by
\[ J = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho-n)t} \ln(c^* K^* e^{gt}) dt. \] (26)

(26) shows that welfare in steady state positively depends on the consumption ratio, \( c^* \), on the balanced growth rate, \( g \), which are determined endogenously, and on \( K^* \) which we normalize to one, i.e. \( K^* = 1 \). From (19) and (23) one realizes that \( \tau E/LK \) has a negative direct effect on \( c^* \) and on \( g \) and a positive indirect effect by reducing the equilibrium surface temperature which implies smaller damages. This suggests that there exists an inverted U-shaped curve between the emission tax ratio and the growth rate and welfare. To see this more clearly we calculate the balanced growth rate, \( c^* \) and the average global surface temperature for different values of \( \tau E/LK \) and for different damage functions. The results are shown in table 2. As to the damage function we use the parameter values from the last subsection, i.e. \( a_1 = 0.04, \psi = 0.05 \), and, in addition, \( a_1 = 0.03, \psi = 0.03 \). Setting \( a_1 = 0.03 \) and \( \psi = 0.03 \) implies that a rise of the surface temperature by 3 (2, 1) degree(s) implies a damage of 0.7 (0.3, 0.09) percent of world GDP.

Table 2. Balanced growth rate, \( c^* \) and \( T^* \) for different values of \( \tau E/LK \) with \( a_1 = 0.04, \psi = 0.05 \) and \( a_1 = 0.03, \psi = 0.03 \), respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \tau E/LK )</th>
<th>( g )</th>
<th>( c^* )</th>
<th>( T^* )</th>
<th>( \tau E/LK )</th>
<th>( g )</th>
<th>( c^* )</th>
<th>( T^* )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0260</td>
<td>0.1702</td>
<td>291.2</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0273</td>
<td>0.1718</td>
<td>291.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.0280</td>
<td>0.1728</td>
<td>287.8</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.0281</td>
<td>0.1729</td>
<td>288.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0055</td>
<td>0.0277</td>
<td>0.1725</td>
<td>287.0</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0280</td>
<td>0.1728</td>
<td>287.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, we can see from table 2 that the balanced growth rate, \( g \), and the consumption share, \( c^* \), react the same manner to changes in the emission tax ratio \( \tau E/LK \) so that maximizing the balanced growth rate also maximizes welfare. Further, table 2 confirms that there exists an inverted U-shaped curve\(^{17}\) between the emission tax ratio and the balanced growth rate and welfare. For the higher damage \( a_2 = 0.04, \psi = 0.05 \) it is optimal to choose the emission tax rate so that the temperature remains at its pre-industrial level implying that the damage is zero. For a lower damage corresponding to

\(^{17}\)We calculated more values which we, however, do not show here.
the temperature increase \((a_2 = 0.03, \psi = 0.03)\) the balanced growth rate is maximized for a value of \(\tau_{E}/LK\) which gives an average surface temperature exceeding the pre-industrial level. In this case, accepting a deviation from the pre-industrial average global surface temperature has positive growth and welfare effects in the long-run.

4 The social planner’s problem

In formulating the optimization problem, a social planner takes into account both the positive and negative externalities of capital. Consequently, for the social planner the resource constraint is given by

\[
\dot{K} = BK D_2(T - T_o) - C - A - (\delta + n)K, K(0) = K_0. \tag{27}
\]

Then the optimization problem is

\[
\max_{C,A} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t}L_0 e^{nt} \ln C \, dt, \tag{28}
\]

subject to (27), (5), (6) and (9), where \(D(\cdot)\) is again given by (24).

To find necessary optimality conditions we formulate the current-value Hamiltonian which is

\[
H(\cdot) = \ln C + \lambda_2 (BK D_2(T - T_o) - C - A - (\delta + n)K) + \lambda_3 (\beta_2 a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma} - \mu M) + \lambda_4 (c_h)^{-1} \cdot \left( \frac{1367.5}{4}(1 - \alpha_1(T)) - (5.6710^{-8}) (19.95/109) T^4 + \beta_1 (1 - \xi) 6.3 \ln \frac{M}{M_o} \right), \tag{29}
\]

with \(\alpha_1(T)\) given by (25). \(\lambda_i, i = 2, 3, 4,\) are the shadow prices of \(K, M\) and \(T\) respectively and \(E = a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma}.\) Note that \(\lambda_2\) is positive while \(\lambda_3\) and \(\lambda_4\) are negative.

The necessary optimality conditions are obtained as

\[
\frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial C} = C^{-1} - \lambda_2 = 0, \tag{30}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial H(\cdot)}{\partial A} = -\lambda_3 \beta_2 a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma - 1} - \lambda_2 = 0, \tag{31}
\]

\[
\lambda_2 = (\rho + \delta) \lambda_2 - \lambda_2 B D(\cdot) - \lambda_3 \beta_2 \gamma a^\gamma K^\gamma A^{-\gamma}, \tag{32}
\]

\[
\lambda_3 = (\rho - n) \lambda_3 + \lambda_3 \mu - \lambda_4 (1 - \xi) \beta_1 6.3 \ln c_h^{-1} M^{-1}, \tag{33}
\]

\[
\lambda_4 = (\rho - n) \lambda_4 - \lambda_2 B K D'(\cdot) + \lambda_4 (c_h)^{-1} 341.875 \alpha_1'(\cdot) + \lambda_4 \left( 5.6710^{-8} (19.95/109) 4 T^3 \right) (c_h)^{-1}, \tag{34}
\]

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with \( \alpha'_1 = -k_1(1 + 0.25\Pi^2(T - 293)^2)^{-1} \). Further, the limiting transversality condition 
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-(\rho + n)t} \left( \lambda_2 K + \lambda_3 T + \lambda_4 M \right) = 0
\]
must hold.

Comparing the optimality conditions of the competitive economy with that of the social planner demonstrates how the government has to set taxes in order to replicate the social optimum. Setting \((13) = (31)\) shows that \( \tau_E/LK \) has to be set such that \( \tau_E/LK = \beta_2(-\lambda_3)/(\lambda_2 K) \) holds. Further, setting the growth rate of per capita consumption in the competitive economy equal to that of the social optimum gives \( \tau = 1 - \alpha^{-1} \).

This result shows that the emission tax per aggregate capital has to be set such that it equals the effective price of emissions, \(-\lambda_3\beta_2\), divided by the shadow price of capital times per capita capital, \(\lambda_2 K\), for all \( t \in [0, \infty) \). This makes the representative household internalize the negative externality associated with capital. Further, it can be seen that, as usual, the government has to pay an investment subsidy (or negative income tax) of \( \tau = 1 - \alpha^{-1} \). The latter is to let the representative agent to take into account the positive spillover effects of capital. The subsidy is financed by the revenue of the emission tax and/or by a non-distortionary tax, like a consumption tax, or a lump-sum tax.

From (30) and (31) we get
\[
\frac{A}{K} = (c (-\lambda_3) \beta_2 \gamma a^\gamma)^{1/(1+\gamma)},
\]
with \( c \equiv C/K \). Using (35), (30) and (32) the social optimum is completely described by the following system of autonomous differential equations
\[
\dot{C} = C \left( BD(\cdot) - (\rho + \delta) - ((C/K) (-\lambda_3) \beta_2 \gamma a^\gamma)^{1/(1+\gamma)} \right),
\]
\[
\dot{K} = K \left( BD(\cdot) - \frac{C}{K} - ((C/K) (-\lambda_3) \beta_2 \gamma a^\gamma)^{1/(1+\gamma)} - (\delta + n) \right), \quad K(0) = K_0,
\]
\[
\dot{M} = (C/K)^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} (-\lambda_3)^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} \beta_2^{1/(1+\gamma)} \gamma^{-\gamma/(1+\gamma)} a^\gamma - \mu M, \quad M(0) = M_0,
\]
\[
\dot{T} = c_h^{-1} \left( 341.875(1 - \alpha_1(T)) - 5.67 \times 10^{-8}(19.95/109)T^4 + 6.3\beta_1 (1 - \xi) \ln \frac{M}{M_0} \right),
\]
\[
T(0) = T_0,
\]
\[
\dot{\lambda}_3 = (\rho - n) \lambda_3 + \lambda_3 \mu - \lambda_4 (1 - \xi) \beta_1 6.3 c_h^{-1} M^{-1},
\]
\[
\dot{\lambda}_4 = (\rho - n) \lambda_4 - B \frac{K}{C} D'(\cdot) + \lambda_4 (c_h)^{-1} 341.875 \alpha'_1(\cdot) + \lambda_4 (5.67 \times 10^{-8}(19.95/109) c_h^{-1} 4 T^3).
\]

As for the competitive economy a BGP is given for variables \( T^*, M^*, \lambda^*_3, \lambda^*_4 \) and \( c^* \) such
that $\dot{T} = \dot{M} = 0$ and $\dot{C}/C = \dot{K}/K$ holds, with $M \geq M_\omega$. It should be noted that $\dot{T} = \dot{M} = 0$ implies $\dot{\lambda}_3 = \dot{\lambda}_4 = 0$.

To study the dynamics we proceed as follows. Since $\dot{C}/C = \dot{K}/K$ holds on the BGP, we get from (37) and (36) $e^* = \rho - n$. Next, we set $\dot{M} = 0$ giving $M = M(\lambda_3, \cdot)$. Inserting $M = M(\lambda_3, \cdot)$ in $\dot{\lambda}_3$ and setting $\dot{\lambda}_3 = 0$ yields $\lambda_4 = \lambda_4(\lambda_3, \cdot)$. Using $M = M(\lambda_3, \cdot)$ and $\lambda_4 = \lambda_4(\lambda_3, \cdot)$ and setting $\dot{T} = 0$ gives $\lambda_3 = \lambda_3(T, \cdot)$. Finally, inserting $\lambda_3 = \lambda_3(T, \cdot)$ in $\dot{\lambda}_4$ gives a differential equations which only depends on $T$ and a $T^*$ such that $\dot{\lambda}_4 = 0$ holds gives a BGP for the social optimum.

For the parameter values employed in the last section with $a_2 = 0.04, \psi = 0.05$ in the damage function shows that there exists a unique BGP which is saddle point stable (two negative real eigenvalues). The temperature and the GHG concentration are $T^* = 287.9$ and $M^* = 1.02$ implying a temperature increase of 0.1 degree.

However, this result depends on the damage function. For extremely small damages going along with global warming we get a different outcome. For example, with $a_2 = 0.004, \psi = 0.004$ a temperature increase of 3 degrees reduces world-wide GDP by merely 0.014 percent. With theses values we get 3 equilibria where two are saddle point stable and one is unstable. The temperatures on the BGPs are $T_1^* = 292, T_2^* = 294.3$ and $T_3^* = 295.4$.

The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, $\mu_i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, corresponding to (38)-(41) are $\mu_{11} = 3.37, \mu_{12} = -3.36, \mu_{13} = 0.31, \mu_{14} = -0.3$ for $T = T_1^*, \mu_{12} = 4.7, \mu_{22} = -4.69, \mu_{23} = 0.005 + 0.12\sqrt{i}, \mu_{24} = 0.005 - 0.12\sqrt{i}$ for $T = T_2^*$ and $\mu_{34} = 6.34 \mu_{32} = -6.33, \mu_{33} = 0.07, \mu_{34} = -0.06$ for $T = T_3^*$. If the damage of the temperature increase is slightly larger then the long-run BGP is again unique. Setting $a_2 = 0.004, \psi = 0.005$ we get $T^* = 291.8$ and this equilibrium is saddle point stable.

5 Conclusions

This paper has analyzed the dynamics of a simple endogenous growth model with global warming. Taking into account that the albedo of the earth depends on the average global surface temperature we could demonstrate that the competitive economy may be characterized by multiple long-run BGPs. In this case, the long-run outcome depends on the initial conditions of the economy.

We should like to point out that the change in the albedo does not have to be large to
generate this outcome. So, our example showed that even a quantitatively small decrease in the albedo may generate multiple equilibria. It is the existence of the feedback effect of a higher temperature influencing the albedo of the earth which leads to this result.

The government plays an important role in our model because the choice of the emission tax ratio does not only affect the temperature change in equilibrium but also the dynamics of the competitive economy. So, the emission tax ratio is crucial as to whether the long-run BGP is unique or whether there exist several BGPs. The social planner’s problem is characterized by a unique BGP for plausible damages going along with global warming. However, if the damages caused by the temperature increase are very small, the social optimum may also generate multiple equilibria and possibly thresholds.

References


