On the transmission of memory; inflation persistence and the great moderation |
Prof. Menelaos Karanasos, Brunel University London
|
| Tuesday, 11.10.2011 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
Complex versus binary menus of contracts: What are the welfare gains? |
Prof. Philippe Gagnepain, University Paris 1 and Paris School of Economics
|
| Tuesday, 18.10.2011 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
This study focuses on the contractual relationships between public authorities
and operators. The new theory of regulation suggests that, in a situation of asymmetric information, the principal may propose the agent a complex menu of linear contracts in order to maximize social welfare. While this practice is well understood from a theoretical point of view, it is difficult to implement in practice; instead, simple binary menus are frequently used in reality. Recently, Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2007) have suggested through a theoretical exercise that simple binary menus capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the full optimal menu (at least 75%). A first goal of our paper is to challenge these results empirically in the particular case of the local public sector. Our preliminary results are
much more pessimistic than those obtained by these authors. As a by-product, we investigate whether the major source of benefit in contract design comes either from better designing cost reimbursement rules or extending contract length. |
| |
|
In and out of equilibrium: evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting and population structure |
Matthijs van Veelen, University of Amsterdam
|
| Tuesday, 15.11.2011 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
Repeated games tend to have large sets of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. But how stable is neutrally stable? We show that there is always a stepping stone path away from equilibrium: there is always a neutral mutant that can enter a population and create an actual selective advantage for a second mutant. Such stepping stone paths out of equilibrium generally exist both in the direction of more and in the direction of less cooperation.
While the central theorems show that such paths out of equilibrium exist, they could still be rare compared to the size of the strategy space. Simulations however suggest that they are not too rare to be found by a reasonable mutation process, and that typical simulation paths take the population from equilibrium to equilibrium through series of indirect invasions.
Furthermore we combine repetition with population structure. Especially the interplay between these two fundamental ingredients of the evolution of cooperation is interesting; with high continuation probabilities, only a little bit of population structure goes a long way. That suggests that the recipe for human cooperation may just have been: a lot of repetition and a little bit of population structure. |
| |
|
TBA |
Daniel Eckert, Universität Graz
|
| Tuesday, 22.11.2011 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
Backward Induction in Games without Perfect Recall |
Dmitriy Kvasov, University of Adelaide
|
| Tuesday, 29.11.2011 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
Selection and the Single-Sector Home Market Effect |
Gabriel Felbermayr, LMU Muenchen
|
| Tuesday, 13.12.2011 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
A dynamic Schmalensee-Salop Model |
Dr. Stefan Behringer, Universität Bonn
|
| Tuesday, 10.01.2012 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
Optimal policy and consumption smoothing effects in the time-to-build AK model |
Prof. Fausto Gozzi, Università LUISS – Rome
|
| Tuesday, 24.01.2012 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
In this paper the dynamic programming approach is exploited in order to identify the closed loop policy function, and the consumption smoothing mechanism in an endogenous growth model with time to build, linear technology and irreversibility constraint in investment. Moreover the link among
the time to build parameter, the real interest rate, and the magnitude of the
smoothing effect is deeply investigated and compared with what happens in a
vintage capital model characterized by the same technology and utility function. Finally we have analyzed the effect of time to build on the speed of
convergence of the main aggregate variables. |
| |
|
Uniform Value in Dynamic Programming |
Jérôme Renault, Université Toulouse 1
|
| Tuesday, 07.02.2012 |
| 06.15 - 07.45 p.m. |
| in V10-122 |
| Paper for the talk |
| |
|
On the empirical relevance of statistical equilibrium in economics |
Prof. Mishael Milakovic, University of Bamberg
|
| Tuesday, 21.02.2012 |
| 6.15 - 7.45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
TBA |
Chiaki Hara, Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
|
| Tuesday, 28.02.2012 |
| 4:15 - 5:45 p.m. |
| in W9-109 |
| No download available. |
| |
|
